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It has recently been suggested that the “so-
cial question” and a “liberal” social history, 
leaning towards social democracy early 
in the twentieth century, would have been 
able to successfully claim a role in nation-
al historiography only in cases where the 
nation-state could already look back on a 
long, continuous history, and where the 
state had remained uncontested in its geo-
graphical boundaries. This may have pre-
pared the ground for a more tolerant at-
mosphere within the discipline of history.1
However, if we consider Europe’s northern 
periphery, especially Finnish, Norwegian 
and Swedish historiographies at the turn 
of the twentieth century, we seem to find 
a rather opposite case.2 In Sweden, which 
had a long history as one of the great pow-
ers in Europe, the state continued to be the 
focus of attention, and the “social question” 
was mostly discussed outside the discipline 
of history. In Norway, however, which had 
an interrupted, discontinuous state history 
and in Finland, which had only limited po-
litical independence before 1917, academ-
ic historians were more receptive early on 
to alternatives to the dominant paradigm 
of individualistic, state-centric political his-
tory, and were eager to study such ideas 
as the German historian Karl Lamprecht’s 
(1856–1915) Kulturgeschichte.3
The aim of this article is to discuss the early 
twentieth-century Finnish reception of Kul-
turgeschichte, with special reference to its 
domestic and foreign policy-related dimen-
sions. The discussion is based on a concep-
tion of politics where “politics” is viewed as 
an activity arising from conditions of diver-
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sity in which different groups press different claims and express different views concerning 
the supposed common good.4 Thus, in this case, “political history” is not limited to the field of 
academic history, which focuses on formal political processes, military actions and diplomatic 
manoeuvrings. Indeed, in principle, almost all phenomena in historiography can be politicised, 
in other words, reinterpreted from a political point of view, if historians and/or their audience 
choose to use history for the creation of something new, in possible opposition to some gener-
ally accepted “truths” and “givens”.5
Closely related to the use of historical research as a political tool is its ideological utilisation 
to attain or maintain a particular social or political order. This notion of ideology, which Karl 
Mannheim called the “particular” conception of ideology, refers here to a collection of ideas 
which, typically, contains certain notions about what it considers to be the best form of govern-
ment and the best economic system.6 For instance, in the case of the early “liberal-minded” so-
cial historians, the interest in economic and social structures was clearly connected to a favour-
able attitude towards the democratisation of the political system. Although an ideology is often 
pejoratively identified with a mere illusion, unreality or “false consciousness”, the term is used 
here in a relatively neutral sense to emphasise the fact that history is never the past but always 
about the past; it is a translation of the past into the historian’s own time and place, an act of in-
terpretation in which representations and values as well as narrative and conceptual structures 
in language inevitably shape the very same subject he or she represents. Thus, while I am de-
scribing the Lamprechtian Kulturgeschichte as an ideological and political tool of certain Finnish 
historians, I am not suggesting a distinction between supposedly value-free academic history 
“proper” and some other schools of thought, such as Kulturgeschichte, as false ideologies. On the 
contrary, I consider all historical research to be positioned and positioning, for due to our corpo-
real being-in-the-world, there is no possibility of an unpositioned site.7 This was acknowledged 
by the Finnish Lamprechtians, too. To cite the social historian Väinö Voionmaa (1869–1947): “The 
emerging new conception of society unavoidably has an effect on the understanding of the past, 
for one has to seek the initial roots of the new development from the past.”8
The political role of history in an ‘unhistorical’ nation
From a cross-European comparative perspective, the case of nation-building in Finland differed 
from most European small nations, such as the Czechs and the Catalans who were fighting for a 
separate state or autonomous status, for the Finnish state as a political unit (the Grand Duchy of 
Finland) was established in 1809 as an unintended, unasked consequence of the Napoleonic Wars. 
Among the educated elites of this former eastern province of the Swedish Empire, the new politi-
cal situation gave rise to an identity crisis, since by and large they had considered themselves to be 
Swedes with the same rights and duties as subjects living west of the Gulf of Bothnia.9
While the 600-year-old ties with Sweden were broken once and for all, the issue of uppermost 
importance for the Finns as a nation and as individuals was “to become aware of the national 
individuality of Finland, to gain the self-knowledge of our inner state, and to develop our definite 
national character”, as Johan Jakob Tengström (1787–1858), professor of philosophy at the Im-










perial Alexander University of Finland (the present University of Helsinki), put it in the earliest 
public discussion on the matter, published in 1817–1818.10 However, as Tengström, a supporter 
of Hegelian philosophy, knew all too well, the constitution of a sovereign state was considered by 
G.W.F. Hegel a precondition for the existence of a people in the full historical sense of the word. 
Because of the lack of an independent political history before 1809, the Finns were in danger of 
becoming classified as an “unhistorical” nation, thereby not deserving of self-determination.11
In order to legitimise the autonomy of Finland both from Sweden and Russia, similarly to other 
subaltern regions of Europe the Finnish nation-builders found the solution in an eclectic com-
bination of Hegel and Herder. On the one hand, the nationally minded historians introduced the 
concepts of “Sweden–Finland” and “the period of Swedish rule”, the former suggesting that the 
realm had actually been a dual monarchy, and the latter implying that Finland as a political unit 
had already existed before “the Swedish conquest”. In both cases, one could extend the scope 
of the state-centric political history of Finland to the ancient past.12 On the other hand, however, 
much more importantly, Herder’s cultural nationalism offered the axiom of ethnicity as the cat-
egorical starting point for the agenda of national emancipation. As the historian Frederick M. Bar-
nard has emphasised, Herder’s focus on a distinctive matrix of language and social culture as 
well as the ordinary people as the true foundations on which nationhood and statehood could be 
built did not involve a shift from the political to the nonpolitical or apolitical but rather a redefini-
tion of the political itself and a radical reappraisal of its bases of legitimacy. Here national culture 
emerged as something not only potentially relevant to politics but as something indispensably 
necessary, which authorised a Kulturnation to stake a claim for its becoming a sovereign state.13
Thus, Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), styled “the national philosopher of Finland” because 
of his role as the ideological leader of the emerging Finnish nationalist movement, argued in 
his major sociopolitical work Läran om staten [The study of the state, 1842] that a nation which 
had grown to self-awareness and was acting in accordance with the demands of its national 
spirit had reached a higher developmental stage than a sovereign state, such as multiethnic, 
multilingual Switzerland, where the national spirit as well as the inhabitants were “completely 
lethargic”.14 In order to achieve this qualitative leap, the nation had to have a history of its own. 
In 1844 Snellman therefore insisted that Finnish historians inaugurate studies on social and 
cultural phenomena because the inner continuity of genuine Finnish history was, in his opinion, 
mainly to be found in the past of the Finnish people and not within governmental and admin-
istrative institutions. In Snellman’s eyes, “the Finnish people” was not only or even primarily a 
folkloristic item, and instead he was especially interested in the history of the working classes 
(de arbetande klasserna), in other words, those tradespeople, industrialists and the proletariat 
that were formed by the emerging modern capitalist system and its accompanying civil liber-
ties (medborgerlig frihet).15 Although the industrial revolution in Finland seemed to be an issue 
for the future, the examples of the most developed European countries (for Snellman, these in-
cluded Britain, France and Germany) had proved to him that the problem of national unity had to 
be considered in a socioeconomic light.16
When applied to the prevailing conditions of the Grand Duchy of Finland, however, the national-
ist programme based on the principle of ethnicity faced considerable challenges. Not only was 
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Finland a part of the multiethnic Russian Empire but it also had indigenous ethnic minorities (the 
Sámi people and the Romani people) and the bilingual majority population, divided into the Finn-
ish- and the Swedish-speakers (at the end of the nineteenth century, some 85 percent and 15 
percent, respectively). While the indigenous ethnic minorities were without any political or eco-
nomic influence, and the ethnic immigrant groups from Russia (Jews, Tatars) extremely small, 
the harsh power struggle for the cultural and, therefore, political leading position was carried 
out by the Finnish-language camp, the Fennomans, and the Swedish-language camp, the Sve-
comans. The language struggle was fuelled by the fact that Swedish was the mother tongue of 
the upper echelons of society, whereas the huge majority of the Finnish-speaking common peo-
ple were without political rights until the 1906 parliamentary reform. Therefore the Fennomans, 
many of whom were originally native Swedish-speakers belonging to the emerging educated 
middle classes, insisted that the unification of Finns as a “real nation with one language and one 
mind”, able to withstand Russian pressure, was possible only if the educated classes chose to 
change their linguistic and cultural identity from Swedish to Finnish. By finnicising their identity, 
the Fennoman activists also aimed at establishing themselves as the mouthpieces of “the will 
of the people” and its “natural” leaders, thus politicising the concept of “the people” (kansa, folk). 
The process resulted in the ethnogenesis of Finnish nationalism, in which the Fennomans and 
the Svecomans started to understand themselves as ethnically distinct from each other, divided 
into the Finnish-speaking Finno-Ugrians and the Swedish-speaking Germanic nation. Moreover, 
the process tended towards the nationalisation and ethnicisation of class conflicts, intensified 
by the social turmoil of the first globalisation period of the modern capitalist economy from the 
1870s onwards.17
The Lamprechtian Kulturgeschichte in Finland
In the light of the above-mentioned cultural and political struggle, it presumably comes as no 
surprise that the early interest in social history and mass phenomena in Finland arose among 
those historians whose ideological background was in the Fennoman movement. For them, 
Karl Lamprecht’s Kulturgeschichte, with its nomothetic approach focused on the substratum of 
economy, society and culture, was nothing new. On the contrary, this “total history” fitted in well 
with the existing idea of the Kulturnation founded on language, society and culture. Furthermore, 
it seemed to offer the means to gain knowledge that could be used as a basis for social policy 
reforms, central to the Fennoman politicians who legitimised their power position by acting as 
the representatives of “the Finnish people”. While almost all leading historians, similar to many 
other European countries, were politically active, the boundaries between government machin-
ery, the academe and civil society were blurred, and the same persons busied themselves in all 
sectors. An example was the Finnish Society of National Economics (Kansantaloudellinen Yh-
distys), founded in 1884 on the model of the German Verein für Socialpolitik (1873). It was led by 
professors of history who also served as senators in the senate of Finland, the grand duchy’s 
highest governing body. Moreover, because of the undifferentiated character of the Finnish aca-
demic world and the academic disciplines in general, the same persons smoothly crossed the 
borders of various disciplines, such as history, sociology, social policy, national economics and 
political sciences. For instance, the Lamprechtian historians K.R. Brotherus (1880–1949) and 










Ernst Nevanlinna (1873–1932) later became professors of political science and national eco-
nomics, respectively.18
Of the first generation of Finnish Lamprechtians, Gunnar Suolahti (formerly Palander, 1876–
1933) and Väinö Voionmaa (formerly Wallin, 1869–1949) made a lifelong career in history.19 
Suolahti specialised in the social history of the “Finnish” gentry in the early modern period,20 fo-
cusing on its socioeconomic stratification, social mobility, livelihood, interests and mentality, un-
derstood as a sort of “social psyche” shaped by the social milieu in its totality. For him, of special 
interest was the question of the emergence of modern individuality, somewhat paradoxically 
considered as a collective phenomenon, out of the constraints created by traditional society.21 
Voionmaa, for his part, was more interested in the rural population and the formation of the Finn-
ish working class by the spread of waged labour and capitalist industrialism, which for him was 
intimately linked with the process of democratisation. According to Voionmaa, the basic tension 
of modern capitalist society was the conflict between class division and the principle of equality, 
in other words, plutocracy versus democracy.22 Although neither Suolahti nor Voionmaa was an 
uncritical follower of Lamprecht, the collectivist approach was something that they both had in 
common. Thus, instead of great leaders, political events and administrative decision-making, 
they concentrated on long-term social, economic and cultural structures and changes. As Suo-
lahti put it in 1905, in this type of history writing, the individual was merely seen as “a fragment 
of the oscillating life of his/her time, emerging from it and merging into it; a result of temporal 
development – and nothing else”.23
It might be an exaggeration to say that there was such a thing as “the Finnish Methodenstreit”, 
for due to the influence of the Fennoman movement a significant group of historians greeted 
Lamprechtian impulses with a favourable response. This does not mean, however, that it was 
unanimously praised. Firstly, Lamprechtian collectivism was connected to a broader debate on 
the philosophy of history, focused on the relation of particularity to universality, and, as its po-
litical dimension, on the ongoing struggle between the idealistic and materialist conceptions of 
history. According to the idealistic critics of Lamprechtianism, many of them philosophers or lit-
erary scholars, the collectivist approach, which explained behaviour by means of socioeconom-
ic structures, left no room for human uniqueness (“the soul”) or free will. Thereby it ultimately 
made individual ethical responsibility impossible. Similarly to other “dangerous” currents of the 
time, such as Nietzschean cultural radicalism and Marxist socialism, it was blamed for leading 
to unrestricted relativism without a horizon of transcendental, absolute values.24
Secondly, Lamprechtianism was rejected by the Swedish-speaking Svecoman historians. In this 
case, the controversy was inherently related to the debate about which area of historiography 
should be accorded the central place in explaining historical events, and which spheres should 
be considered structurally and causally fundamental. In the eyes of the Svecoman camp, the 
Finnish Lamprechtians’ dismissal of political actors, military leaders and other great individuals 
was politically, not scholarly, motivated, for it allowed the masses of ordinary Finnish-speaking 
people to step forward into the limelight of historical interest as actors of the utmost impor-
tance. Therefore, it seemed to sanctify the teleological conception of Finnish history, in which 
the progress of Fennoman ethnic nationalism became inevitable, dictated by irresistible histori-
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cal forces. As a counterreaction, the Svecomans emphasised Finland’s historical relation to the 
Swedish Empire, insisting that there was no separate “history of Finland” before 1809. Moreover, 
as the defence of scientific objectivity against the ethnicisation of Finnish history, in which the 
Swedish-speaking elites were described as “unnational foreigners”, they laid stress on the mi-
nutiae of archival scholarship, based on a positivist craftsman’s ideology of historical research 
with little room for questions on the ontology, epistemology or metatheories of history and so-
ciety.25 On reflection, however, their descriptive studies on state actions, institutions and influen-
tial personalities were also ideologically biased, even the reformist Svecoman perspective was 
predominantly a “top–down” one, and ordinary people merely played the role of passive objects. 
Similarly, historiography gave full historical agency only to the upper echelons of society, and 
thus implicitly reinforced the ordinary people’s prevailing subalternity.26
Finally, the battle line between the Fennomans and the Svecomans was blurred by the fact that 
there was also a group of ardent Fennoman historians who, nevertheless, objected to the collec-
tivist approach. The leader of this fraction was the historian Arno Rafael Cederberg (1885–1948), 
the first professor of Estonian and Nordic history at the University of Tartu, Estonia, in 1919. In 
Cederberg’s case, the objection to Lamprechtianism had developed into a strong personal dis-
like for Gunnar Suolahti, which in its intensity came close to the German assault against Karl 
Lamprecht.27 According to Cederberg, Suolahti, in his position as university professor, had nearly 
ruined a whole generation of future Finnish historians by encouraging them to make “irrespon-
sible generalisations” and to focus on typical, large-scale social phenomena, thus neglecting the 
factual accuracy and the detailed reflection of first-hand sources. For Cederberg, the motor of 
historical development was located in the great personalities through whom history made prog-
ress. In his case, however, contrary to the Svecoman camp, the emphasis on individuals did not 
necessarily lead to an elitist perspective, for he was also fascinated by courageous, heroic com-
mon men of the past.28 To sum up, while the Lamprechtian historians emphasised the power of 
the masses, Cederberg wanted to elevate prominent ethnically Finnish persons to crucial posi-
tions in the national history, regardless of their social class.
The ideological and political role of Lamprechtianism
In the Finnish history of historiography, early Lamprechtian social historians have often been ac-
claimed as bold reformers who successfully challenged the narrowly factual positivist approach 
and the antidemocratic political bias of the established historical scholarship, thus contributing 
to the advancement of the historical discipline and the democratisation of Finnish society.29 In 
the following discussion, it is not my intention to deny this conception, for there is no reason to 
contest the groundbreaking role of the Lamprechtians. This, however, does not undo the fact 
that there were also other dimensions in their work that cannot be unambiguously considered 
as “progressive” and “democratic”. I will, therefore, at the end of this article, briefly discuss some 
of these ideological and political features which, from a crossnational comparative perspec-
tive, can be considered typical of national narratives trying to come to terms with the potentially 
contradictory concepts of “class”, “people” and “nation”.30 Moreover, they also suggest how inti-
mately the formation of national narratives and nation-building in Europe was connected with 










imperialism and colonial rule.31 As an example, I will use Väinö Voionmaa’s works that clearly 
illustrate the case.
In Finland, Voionmaa’s three-volume study (1903–1910) on the history of the city of Tampere, the 
major industrial town of the country, was the first extensive historiographical study that aimed 
at analysing the breakthrough of the modern industrial capitalist system from the viewpoint of 
the social classes and their mutual relations. For Voionmaa, the history of Tampere provided 
an opportunity to study the formation of the modern working class, its historical emergence 
from certain groups of manual labourers and craftsmen, and their gradual transformation into 
modern wageworkers and the proletariat. In this work, similar to his edited two-volume work 
on the history of social democracy in Europe (1906, 1909), he promoted the Marxist-based idea 
that in modern industrial society, the emancipation of the working class was inevitable because 
of the new mode of production and the intensifying struggle between labour and capital caused 
by this mode. “The working class movement had to advance, socialism had to be born,” Voion-
maa stated in 1909.32
However, despite his Marxist-based conception of class and society and his openly leftist politi-
cal sympathies, Voionmaa joined the Finnish Social Democratic Party only in 1918, when after the 
devastating Finnish Civil War the party had clearly rejected the doctrine of Marxist class struggle 
and adopted the reformist, revisionist conception of socialism. For him, socialism was, above all, a 
movement pleading the case of inner self-formation (in Finnish, sivistys, in German, Bildung),33 and 
social ethics that were based on the principles of equality and justice. Emblematic of this thinking 
was the fact that he had initially become acquainted with working-class activists in the temper-
ance movement where the (self-) educational dimension of popular mobilisation was strongly em-
phasised.34 It is thus no surprise to notice that in the case of Voionmaa, social class clearly played 
the role of a subdiscourse to the national master narrative rather than that of a counterdiscourse 
which, with an international revolutionary content, could have threatened the Finnish nation’s integ-
rity. The concepts of “the working class” and “the people” thus became interchangeable, the main 
issue being the integration of the working class into the Finnish nation.35
In this respect, the scholarly focus on the long-term changes in socioeconomic structures can 
be interpreted as having had an ideological role, for it implicitly suggested the beneficent conse-
quences and historical importance of continuous evolution in contrast to radical ruptures, dis-
continuity and revolution. Indeed, the stronger the pressure from Russia (from 1917 onwards, 
Bolshevik Soviet Russia) and the Marxist working-class movement on the national unity of Fin-
land, the stronger the academic historians’ emphasis on the necessity of a “proper” historical 
worldview, based on an idea of steady, evolutionary continuity.36 When one takes into account 
that at the beginning of the twentieth century some 75 percent of the students who took their 
master’s degree from the arts faculty of the University of Helsinki had history as a major or mi-
nor subject,37 historical knowledge could be efficiently used in legitimating a certain political or-
der among the whole age group of the future cultural elite.
As an example of the explicitly political use of historiography, one can take Voionmaa’s Suomen 
uusi asema [The new position of Finland], published in 1919 after the collapse of the Russian 
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Empire but before the signing of the Treaty of Tartu (1920) that confirmed the border between 
Finland and Soviet Russia. In this book, aimed at popular enlightenment, Voionmaa utilised the 
Lamprechtian perspective of socioeconomic “total history” and the geopolitical ideas of the Ger-
man geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Lamprecht’s colleague and scientific inspiration, 
in his discussion on territorial politics. On the one hand, Voionmaa admitted that the borders 
had always been contested and shifting, because from the European perspective, Finland be-
longed to “the precarious zone” between the East and the West which ran from the Balkan Pen-
insula along the Danube and the Vistula all the way to the Baltic countries, Lapland and the Arc-
tic Ocean. On the other hand, however, according to Voionmaa, the Finnic peoples38 themselves 
comprised an ethnic mesoregion, a totality of economic, social, cultural and geographic charac-
teristics which taken together defined “Finland’s natural borders”. At the core of this discussion 
was Eastern Karelia, the peripheral borderland between Finland and Soviet Russia, which, for 
the most part of its written history, had been a part of the Russian Empire but which, in the light 
of these “clear-cut natural borders”, actually belonged to “Greater Finland”, cherished by the pre-
Second World War pan-Finnicism.
With Voionmaa’s discussion on the justified expansion of Finland, one is brought back to the 
political dimension of the Herderian Kulturnation, for in his case, Finnish expansionism was le-
gitimatised by the concept of “sivistys” (Bildung), a crucial concept in Herder’s philosophy, too. In 
Voionmaa’s vision, among the Finnic peoples, the Finns had achieved the highest level in the pro-
cess of self-formation (Bildungsprozeß), which entitled them to incorporate Eastern Karelia into 
the independent state of Finland in order to elevate the Karelians into a Kulturnation. Similar to 
his conception of socialism, he emphasised here the replacement of force by culture. As neigh-
bours to the powerful Soviet Russia, the Finnic peoples could, he assumed, defend their right to 
existence only by peaceful means and inner civilisational strength.39 Nevertheless, and typically 
for the colonialist rhetoric of the time, the Finnish conquest of Eastern Karelia was presented 
as the benevolent development of that peripheral, backward “dark corner” of Europe in order 
to guarantee it the civilisational achievements already reached by Western Europe. In all, this 
rhetoric manifested the power of colonialist thinking in the postimperial European small-states 
among the reformers who, as in the case of the Finnish Lamprechtians, merely saw themselves 
as the victims of colonial oppression by the old empires of Eurasia.
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